The traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) suggests that the minimum return required by an investor should be equal to the return of a risk-free asset (Reilly & Brown, 2003) , which should be stable (Reilly & Brown, 2006) , not influenced by external factors (Harrington, 1987) , and certain (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2010) . Evidence, however, suggests that risk-free asset returns vary (Brunnermeier, 2008) , and that "there is really no such thing as a truly riskless asset" (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2005:312). The pioneering studies of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989) 
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here is a general assumption that investors will require greater compensation (expected returns) from a riskier investment (Glosten, Jagannathan & Runkle, 1993) . The presence of business cycles (Harrison & Zhang, 1999) , financial crises (Ghysels, Plazzi & Valkanov, 2013) , tax laws and an evolving regulatory environment (Lo, 2004) , and the changing risk appetite of investors (Misina, 2008) , renders this risk-return relationship time-varying (Harrison & Zhang, 1999) . Under these ever-changing conditions investors must maintain an optimal group of assets that suits the preferred risk appetite, where Markowitz (1952) proposed a mean-variance approach to ensure optimal portfolio allocation. According to this approach, different assets are combined which minimise the variance for a given level of return. This implies that due to the linear relationship between the expected return and the risk (standard deviation) of a portfolio (Reilly & Brown, 2003) , investors will incessantly require a higher level of compensation (expected returns) as the level of market risk increases. To determine this level of expected returns relative to the market risk present, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) introduced the mean-variance Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which considers only the mean and variances of returns under the conditions of perfect market competition. Although, according to Black (1972) , the greatest criticism of the mean-variance CAPM is the assumption of the presence of a 'riskless asset'. Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005:312) argue that "there is really no such thing as a truly riskless asset", which implies that the incorrect specification of a risk-free rate can lead to insufficient allocation of scarce resources (Bruner, Eades, Harris & Higgins, 1998) .
The implications of incorrectly specifying a risk-free rate also extends to the measuring of portfolio performance and to option pricing. Regarding the latter, the Black-Scholes model assumes that the risk-free rates are constant and known (Ray, 2012) . This model is considered to be flawed as it assumes that risk-free rates exist, which is not the case in the real world (Ray, 2012) . Also, there is evidence which suggest that risk-free rates are not constant, especially during times of uncertainty (Brunnermeier, 2008) ; it also contain information about future volatility (Glosten, Jagannathan & Runkle, 1993) ; and are not always normally distributed (Van Heerden, 2015) . The absence Although, many of the models proposed to identify structural breaks are not always robust against heavy tails or require that the location of possible breaks are specified prior or do not allow for dependence in the data under investigation (Reschenhofer, 2004) . Furthermore, alternative distributional stability models, such as Inoue's (2001) non-parametric test is unable to provide meaningful estimates of break locations in the presence of multiple breaks. From these findings it can be argued that it is difficult to detect multiple structural breaks accurately and to distinguish between structural breaks and other non-stationarity-like smooth transitions (see for example Reschenhofer, 1997) . There is also no clear indication on how these structural breaks can be eliminated effectively, so this paper will not account for the possible presence of structural breaks in the higher moments.
The second step of empirical study will be to evaluate the level of risk exposure of several risk-free rate proxies over the pre-, during and post-financial crisis periods. This step will commence by establishing if the prerequisite of these risk-free assets, having a zero variation in the returns, is satisfied. This will be accomplished by consulting the Exponential-Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) model, which can be formulated as follows (J.P. Morgan/Reuters, 1996) : 
where the EWMA model depends on the decay factor, λ 0 < λ < 1 , which determines the relative weights that must be applied to returns. In estimating the decay factor the following steps must be followed (J.P. Morgan/Reuters, 1996):
Firstly, Π must be calculated. This can be achieved by taking the sum of all N minimal Root-Mean-Square-Errors (RMSE), τs:
where RMSE C = Finally, the optimal decay factor λ is (J.P. Morgan/Reuters, 1996) :
where the final optimal decay factor applied is the weighted average of individual optimal decay factors. The third step of the empirical study extends the evaluation of risk present, which evaluates the annualised covariance with the share market (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2010) , as a risk-free asset must not move in tandem with the market (Charteris & Strydom, 2011) . This is followed by an array of several risk measures, which involves the annualised standard deviation (derived from Sharpe, 1966) ; the upside and downside risk (derived from Sortino & Van der Meer, 1991; Keating & Shadwick, 2002) ; the maximum drawdown (derived from Young, 1991) ; the deviation in the maximum drawdown (derived from Burke, 1994) ; and the deviation in the maximum upturn, which are, respectively:
Annualised standard deviation =
Upside risk = 
Maximum drawdown MD = max u ∈ 0, t P u − T u ,
Deviation in maximum drawdown = MD Am 8 n m:6 ,
Deviation in maximum upturn = MU Ao
where R A is the weekly return observation of asset i; R A is the average of all the return observations of asset i; R q is the weekly return observation of the market; R q is the average of all the return observations of the market; n is the number of observations under evaluation; and where MU is the maximum upturn, which can be formulated as follows:
Maximum upturn MU = max u ∈ 0, t T u − P u ,
where P u is the return value at the peak over the interval of size t; T u is the return value of the following trough over the interval of size t; K is the number of drawdowns of asset i; and L is the number of upturns of asset i.
In additional to the above mentioned risk measures, this paper will also evaluate the price risk of the fixed coupon bonds under evaluation, which will be accomplished by means of consulting the bond price sensitivity if the yieldto-maturity would to change by 100 basis points. This estimation will be realised by examining both the approximate modified duration and convexity. The modified duration provides additional information regarding the extent to which the price of the bond will change (in percentage terms) for a given change in its yield-to-maturity (Koch & Macdonald, 2003; Rose & Hudgins, 2010) . However, modified duration can only be obtained if the Macaulay duration for the period under evaluation is already known. An alternative to this approach, and which this paper applies, is to approximate modified duration directly by estimating Equation 14. The objective of this approximation is to estimate the slope of the price-yield curve. To estimate the slope the yield-to-maturity is changed up and down by the same amount ∆ yield , which enables the estimation of the bond prices at each new yield-to-maturity (Adams & Smith, 2015) . Although, like modified duration, the approximate modified duration still assumes that there is a linear relationship between the price and yield of the bond. This can be remedied by adjusting the approximate modified duration with an approximate convexity (Equation 15) estimate (Adams & Smith, 2015) . Convexity is viewed as an important risk-management tool when considering the measurement of price risk, as it provides additional insight as to how investors will experience losses from fluctuations in the bond prices that are caused by non-parallel yield curve shifts (Koch & Macdonald, 2003; Rose & Hudgins, 2010 ). This will, enable a more true estimation of the price value of a basis point (Adams & Smith, 2015) . The estimation of bond price sensitivity with the change of 100 basis points %∆PV will serve as the price risk measure in this paper (Equation 16 ).
Approximate Convexity AC =
where PV 5 denotes the bond price when the yield is decreased; PV D denotes the bond price when the yield is increased; and PV d denotes the original bond price (Adams & Smith, 2015) .
Finally, to evaluate the reliability and stability of the different risk-free rate proxies under evaluation in terms of risk-adjusted performance, a static Omega ratio will be consulted. This is based on the notion that the returns of riskless assets must be stable over time compared to more risky assets (Reilly & Brown, 2006) . Though, to overcome the static perspective that is generated from the risk and performance measures in this paper, a 100-week rolling Omega ratio is introduced as a unique risk stability measure. This rolling Omega provides a unique perspective of how risk evolved over time of a risk-free rate proxy. The Omega ratio, originally introduced by Keating and Shadwick (2002) , includes all the information that is encoded in all the moments (variance, mean, skewness, and kurtosis) without any prior assumptions (De Wet, Krige & Smit, 2008) . It considers both the upside potential (higher partial moments) and downside potential (lower partial moments) of an investment over the entire distribution, which implies that it has the ability to treat upside and downside risk differently (Gilli, Schumann, Di Tollo & Cabej, 2011:95) . The Omega ratio is (Eling & Schuhmacher, 2007) :
where r denotes the selected threshold; x denotes the random one-period return of an investment; a and b denote the upper and lower bounds of the return distribution, respectively; 1 − F x dx ‡ a denotes the upside potential; and F x dx â denotes the downside potential.
DATA
The time horizon under evaluation is divided into a pre-, during, and post-financial crisis period. The pre-financial crisis period spans January 2005 to December 2006, whereas the crisis period spans January 2007 to December 2009 and the post-financial crisis period January 2010 to August 2014. The starting point of the pre-financial crisis period was determined by the availability of the R186 bond rate and the different bond indices under evaluation, whereas the time span of the post-financial crisis period was determined by the availability of the R157 bond rate, as it Isolating all the effects of the financial crisis was difficult, so the crisis period was carefully determined in order to incorporate key events. This period starts at the date when the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced that no more risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities would be purchased (27 February 2007) . It continues by incorporating the event when Northern Rock was taken into state ownership by the Treasury of the United Kingdom (17 February 2008) , and the announcements of Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated filing for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. Lastly, it continues until after the announcement of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included a variety of tax cuts and spending measures that were intended to promote economic recovery in the United States (US).
Weekly risk-free rates (5-day averages) of several money market and capital market risk-free rate proxies were evaluated, as reported by Table 1 . The extent of the proxies included in this paper was based on the historical findings and suggestions as already reported in Section 2. The South African 3-month Treasury Bill, the Negotiable Certificates of Deposits (NCDs) rates, the Benchmark Overnight Rate on Deposits rate (SABOR) and the overnight FX rate were obtained from the South African Reserve Bank's website (SARB, 2015) , whereas the rest of the riskfree rate proxies were obtained from the INET BFA (2015) database. Note that the following risk-free rate proxies were excluded from this paper: the 12-month fixed deposit yield was excluded, as only yearly data were available; the 3-month Banker's Acceptances (BA) discount rate was excluded, as the data are only available until February 2014; the R153 bond rate was excluded, as it was only available until August 2009; and the R208 bond rate was excluded, as it was only available from November 2006. Finally, the JSE All Share index (J203) was utilised as the equity market proxy to estimate the level of covariance between the market index and the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation. The weekly J203 index values were obtained from the INET BFA (2015) database. The overnight FX rate refers to the 1-day rate on Rand funding in the foreign exchange swap market. The annual yields were also converted to weekly yields, respectively. This ensures that all the data under investigation are in the same format.
RESULTS
The empirical analyses commenced by evaluating the descriptive statistics of the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation, in order to accentuate the importance of consulting alternative risk measure rather than only relying on the standard deviation, which fails to provide a true reflection of actual risk (Harlow, 1991; Van Heerden, 2015) . From the results reported by Table 2 and A in the Appendix it is evident that on average all the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation can be considered to be leptokurtic (peaked) for all three time periods. However, averages can be misleading, as all of the government bonds (R157, R186, R203, R204), the 12-month JIBAR and 12-month NCD rates were exceptions during the pre-financial crisis period, which exhibited platykurtic (flat) characteristics. This observation changed dramatically during the financial crisis period, when evaluating these proxies individually, where more than half of the risk-free rate proxies (13 of the 21) exhibited platykurtic (flat) characteristics. Table 2 also reports that on overage the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation exhibited a positive skewness during the pre-and post-financial crisis periods, but a negative skewness during the financial crisis period. This same trend is also evident when evaluating the proxies individually, as reported by Table A1 & A2 in the Appendix. Only the 12-month Call deposit index, R157, R203, and the R204 exhibited a negative skewness, whereas the rest of the proxies under evaluation exhibited a positive skewnss. This number escalated to 12 proxies during the financial crisis period, which exhibited a negative skewness and remained at a higher level (7 of 21) over the post-financial crisis period, compared to the pre-financial crisis period. Overall, these findings imply that financial analysts should still be cautious when consulting traditional risk-adjusted performance measures, as the presence of higher moments can corrode the accuracy of traditional performance measures.
To accentuate the effect of the higher moments five different normality tests were consulted to obtain more convincing results, which entail the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests with the Lilliefors correction, the Cramér-von Misses' (CVM) test, the Anderson-Darling (AD) test, the Jarque-Bera (JB) test, and the Shapiro-Wilk (SW). From the results reported by Table 3 and A in the Appendix it is evident that the presence of non-normal returns is substantial over the three time periods under evaluation. During the pre-financial crisis period the 3-to-7-year bond index, 7-to-12-year bond index, over 12-year bond index, R203 and the R204 were the only exceptions which exhibited normal distributed returns. However, the during and post-financial crisis periods unveiled more compelling results, where all the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation exhibited non-normal return distributions. From these results the conclusion can be made that traditional risk measures, such as the standard deviation, will fail to provide a true reflection of actual risk, which is why the standard deviation results from Table B to D in the Appendix will not be discussed and will be excluded from the remaining empirical analysis. The next step of the empirical analysis was to evaluate the level of volatility, risk and the risk-adjusted performance of each risk-free rate proxy under evaluation. This step is based on the prerequisites that risk-free assets should have no variation in their returns (Sharpe, 1964) , should not move in tandem with the market (Charteris & Strydom, 2011) , their returns must be completely free of any type of risk, and their returns must be stable over time compared to more risky assets (Reilly & Brown, 2006) . This was accomplished by firstly evaluating the reliability and stability (variation) of the returns of the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation by means of a static Omega ratio. The Omega ratio was ideal for this paper as it incorporates all the higher moments and does not make any assumptions of normality. The Omega estimate for each risk-free rate proxy was estimated by assigning equal weights to both the upside and downside potential (see Equation 17 ). From the results reported by Table 4 it is evident that there were no regularities (stability) between the three time periods under evaluation when determining the most ideal risk-free rate proxy, which were also emphasised by the geometric returns reported by Table B to D. From these results it can already be argued that there was some level of variation and instability in the returns of the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation. Table 4 also shows that, based only on the static Omega estimates, the 3-month Call deposit index could have been considered as the most ideal risk-free rate proxy over the pre-financial crisis, which is also the only money market proxy under the top five rankings. However, this perspective changed for the during and postfinancial crisis periods, where the capital market proxies (bond indices) attained the top four rankings, with the 3-to-7-year bond index and the 7-to-12-year bond index ranking first in the during and post-financial crisis periods, respectively. The money market proxies performed poorly in these periods, where the best money market proxies, entailing the overnight FX rate and the 3-month Call deposit index, ranked fifth in the during and post-financial crisis periods, respectively (see Table 4 ). It is also interesting to note that it was in some instances difficult to distinguish between the extremely small upside potential estimates of the proxies ranking from fifth place and lower, making it impossible to establish the least ideal risk-free rate proxies with the use of a static Omega ratio (see Table  4 ). Source: Compiled by author. Note: Equal weights were assigned to upside and downside potential in the estimation of the Omega ratio. The geometric return of the 1-to-3-year bond index over the horizon under evaluation was assigned as the threshold to estimate the static Omega ratios for the pre-and during financial crisis periods, respectively. The geometric return of the 3-to-7-year bond index over the horizon under evaluation was assigned as the threshold to estimate the static Omega ratios for the post-financial crisis period.
The next prerequisite that was evaluated included determining if the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation moved in tandem with the market (with the JSE All Share index as the equity market proxy), which was accomplished by consulting the annualised covariance. From Table 5 to 7 it is evident that the money market proxies dominated the top three rankings during the pre-and during financial crisis periods. The 6-month JIBAR rate and the 12-month JIBAR rate exhibited the smallest covariance during the pre-and during financial crisis periods. However, the capital market proxies dominated the top two rankings (R157 & R186, respectively) during the post-financial crisis, but were followed by the 12-month NCD rate as the best performing money market proxy. The most favourite riskfree rate proxies recommended by past studies, which entail the R157 and the 3-month T-Bill rate, did not perform well in terms of covariance during the pre-and during financial crisis periods. The R157 ranked 4 th and 14 th , respectively, whereas the 3-month T-Bill rate ranked 8 th , 9 th and 10 th during the pre-, during and post-financial crisis periods, respectively. It is also interesting to note that all the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation exhibited some level of covariance, but the presence of covariance was too small to report in Table A to D in the Appendix.
In addition to having no covariance with the market as a prerequisite, Sharpe (1964) also argued that risk-free assets should have no variation in their returns. To test this prerequisite this paper consulted the Exponential-Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) model to estimate the level of volatility during all three time periods under evaluation. From Table 5 to 7 it is evident that the money market proxies under evaluation dominated the top two rankings during all three time periods under evaluation. The Rand overnight deposit index (ranked 1 st ) and the SABOR rate (ranked 2 nd ) exhibited the least volatility over all three time periods. The money market proxies also dominated the 3 rd position on the rankings of least volatility, with the 3-month T-Bill rate dominating during the financial crisis period and the 3-month Call deposit index during the post-financial crisis period. The only exception is during the pre-financial crisis period where a capital market proxy (R186) attained the 3 rd position. Overall, there were no regularities over the different time periods, therefore, confirming the presence of variation and instability in the returns of the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation. Poor performance in terms of volatility is also observable for the more favourable risk-free proxies recommended by past studies (R157 & 3-month T-Bill rate). The 3-month T-Bill rate performed relatively better compared to the R157, attaining a 4 th place during the pre-financial crisis period and a 6 th place as its lowest ranking over all three time periods. The R157, on the other hand, ranked 9 th , 11 th and 17 th over the pre-, during and post-financial crisis periods, respectively, making it the least favourite in terms of volatility. High volatility was also observable in the case of the bond indices, especially for the over 12-year bond index, which performed the worst of all the risk-free rate proxies over all three time periods under evaluation (see Table 5 to 7).
To extend the measurement of risk present in the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation, this paper also consulted upside and downside risk, maximum drawdown, deviation in the maximum drawdown, and the deviation in the maximum upturn. The first observation that can be derived from the results reported by Table 5 to 7 is that all the risk-free rate proxies under evaluation obtained some level risk, which emphasises the argument of Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005) and Ray (2012), which disagreed with assumption of the existence of a risk-free rate. The only exception was in terms of downside risk, where the bond indices did not exhibit any level of downside risk over the three periods under evaluation. This exception also included the 6-month Call deposit index in the pre-financial crisis period. From Table 5 to 7 it is also evident that there are no regularities between the different risk measures over the three time periods under evaluation, thus making it difficult to derive a final conclusion as to which riskfree rate proxy can be considered as the most ideal in terms of the least risk. In order to overcome this problem, equal weights were assigned to the different risk measures in order to derive an overall risk ranking, as reported by Table 5 to 7. The results from Table 5 to 7 report that the money market proxies under evaluation dominated the top three rankings of the least risk over the pre-and post-financial crisis periods. The 3-month NCD rate was the best performing proxy, followed by the 3-month T-Bill rate and the 6-month NCD rate during the pre-financial crisis period. This ranking, however, differ if volatility is included as an additional risk measure, where the 3-month T-Bill rate performed the best, followed by the 3-month NCD rate and the SABOR rate. During the post-financial crisis period the 3-month NCD rate and the SABOR rate ranked the best, whereas the 3-month T-Bill rate ranked 3 rd , but was replaced by the Rand overnight deposit rate if volatility was included as an additional risk measure. This observation, however, changed during the financial crisis period, where capital market proxies exhibited better performance in term of lower risk. The R186, SABOR rate, and the R157 were the best performing proxies with the least risk, but by including volatility as an additional risk measure the SABOR rate, 3-month NCD rate, and the Rand overnight deposit index were the best performing proxies. The bond indices, on the other hand, were again the worst performing risk-free rate proxies, where the over-12-year bond index ranked last. 1-to-3-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 6-month JIBAR yield 7-to12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 6-month JIBAR yield Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 6-month Call deposit index 6-month Call deposit index 3-month T-Bill rate 12-month Call deposit index 1-to-3-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 6-month JIBAR yield 3-to-7-year bond index Rand overnight deposit rate 1-to-3-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 6-month JIBAR yield SABOR rate 7-to12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 12-month Call deposit index 3-month Call deposit index 3-to-7-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Rand overnight deposit rate R204 12-month JIBAR yield 1-to-3-year bond index Rand overnight deposit rate 6-month Call deposit index 3-month T-Bill rate 12-month Call deposit index 3-month Call deposit index R203 3-month Call deposit index 12-month Call deposit index R204 6-month Call deposit index 1-to-3-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index R157 7-to12-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index Over-12-year bond index R186 Over-12-year bond index R 186 12-month Call deposit index 1-to-3-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index 12-month Call deposit index 6-month Call deposit index 3-month Call deposit index 3-month Call deposit index 12-month Call deposit index SABOR rate 6-month Call deposit index 1-to-3-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 3-to-7-year bond index 7-to12-year bond index Rand overnight deposit rate 7-to12-year bond index Over-12-year bond index 1-to-3-year bond index Over-12-year bond index Source: Compiled by author. Note: The "Overall ideal" ranking was established by assigning equal weights to covariance, volatility (EWMA), to the different alternative risk measures, to the geometric returns, and to the static Omega rankings.
From the overall results reported by Table 5 to 7, it is interesting to note that the business cycle could also have been utilised as an indicator to determine the most ideal risk-free rate proxy. During the economic downswing (represented by the financial crisis period) government bonds were found to be the more preferred selection (lower overall risk), whereas money market proxies (especially the 3-month T-Bill rate and 3-month NCD rate) exhibited more dominance in terms of lower overall risk during the economic upswing phases (represented by the pre-& post-The Clute Institute financial crisis periods) under evaluation. These findings motivate the need for future studies to determine if the same conclusion can be made for other financial and economic crisis events, as the findings from this paper contradict one of the characteristics of a risk-free rate asset, which states that risk-free assets should not be influenced by economic events (see Harrington, 1987) .
In order to conclude the risk evaluation process, this paper also included price risk to further evaluate the reliability of the fixed coupon government bonds. The estimations of the bond price sensitivity with a change of 100 basis points were used as the price risk proxy for each government bond (see Equation 16), after which price risk was assigned the same weight as the other risk measures in order to generate the "Overall ideal government bond" ranking. From the results reported by Table 8 it is evident that R157 (ranked 1 st ) and R186 (ranked 2 nd ) was the government bond with the lowest price risk over the three time periods under evaluation, respectively. The "Overall ideal government bond" rankings also confirmed the creditability of previous studies who recommended the use of the R157. However, as the R157 already matured on 15 September 2014, the R186 will be a suitable replacement, followed by R203 and R204, respectively, based on the limited proxies evaluated in this paper. R157  R157  R157  R186  R186  R186  R203  R203  R203  R204 R204 R204
POST-FINANCIAL CRISIS PERIOD (Ranked from best to worst) Overall ideal (includes all previous measures) Price risk ranking Overall ideal government bond

DURING FINANCIAL CRISIS PERIOD (Ranked from best to worst) Overall ideal (includes all previous measures)
Price risk ranking Overall ideal government bond
Source: Compiled by author. Note: The "Overall ideal government bond" ranking was established by assigning equal weights to covariance, volatility (EWMA), to the different alternative risk measures, to the geometric returns, and to the static Omega rankings. The "Overall ideal" ranking was also determined by including price risk and by assigning the same weight to price risk as the previous risk and performance measures used to determine the previous overall ideal rankings.
From all the findings above it was possible to generate an "Overall ideal" ranking to determine the most suitable risk-free rate proxy for the three time periods under evaluation. However, as there were no regularities found in the results, this paper assigned equal weights to covariance, volatility (EWMA), to the different alternative risk measures (excluding price risk, as this was only applicable to government bonds), to the geometric returns, and to the static Omega rankings, in order to be able to derive a conclusive answer. From Table 5 to 7 it was evident that the most ideal risk-free rate proxies were the 3-month T-Bill rate, the government bonds (R157, R204, R186, R203, respectively) and the 3-month NCD rate for the pre-financial crisis period. However, during the financial crisis period the money market proxies dominated more, where the 3-month NCD rate, SABOR rate, 3-month JIBAR yield, 6-month NCD rate, and 3-month T-Bill rate attained the top five rankings, respectively. The same observation could also be made for the post-financial crisis period, in terms of the money market proxies, where the 3-month NCD rate, 3-month T-Bill rate, 6-month NCD rate, SABOR rate, and Rand overnight deposit rate were the top five overall performers, respectively. The same performance was, however, not observable for the top performing capital market proxy (R157, based on Table 8 ), as it decreased in rankings from 6 th place during the financial crisis period to 11 th place during the post-financial crisis period. The results reported by Table 5 to 7 also concluded that the bond indices exhibited the worst overall performance, ranking the over-12-year bond index as the worst risk-free rate proxy to consider. This leads to the final step of the empirical analysis, as all of the risk measures reported above are limited to a static perspective. To overcome this shortcoming this paper introduces a 100-week rolling Omega ratio as a unique risk stability measure, which has the ability to illustrate how risk evolved over time. To demonstrate this dynamic approach, this paper estimated a 100-week rolling Omega for the over-12-year bond (Figure 1 ) and 7-to-12-year bond (Figure 2 ) index, which were the two lowest ranked proxies based on the results reported by Table 5 to 7. From the figures it is apparent that the over-12-year bond and 7-to-12-year bond indices exhibited a significant level of risk, which also varied over the three time periods under evaluation. These findings emphasised the results already reported by Table 5 to 7 and further justified the unreliability of these two indices as suitable risk-free rate proxies. This variation in risk, as illustrated by Figure 1 and 2, can also be converted into Table 9 , which reports only the substantial increases and decreases in risk over the three time periods under evaluation. From the results reported by Table 9 , it is interesting to note that there was already a substantial increase in risk before Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated filed for bankruptcy on 15 September 2008. Furthermore, although, the 7-to-12-year bond index exhibited a small recovery at the beginning of June 2008, both indices exhibited a further increase in risk by the end of November 2008, which accentuates the beginning of the devastating effects of the global financial crisis. However, the indices did exhibit a significant level of recovery during segments of 2010, 2011 and by end of June 2013, but by the end of August 2014 the over-12-year bond index exhibited another significant increase in risk, which can be assigned to the aftereffects of the Euro crisis, and the political unrest and financial uncertainty in the South African markets. Overall, these results accentuate the benefit and applicability of applying such a dynamic approach, which can assist investors and financial analysts in evaluating the evolving risk of an investment, portfolio or hedge fund. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The mean-variance Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) requires a risk-free rate in order to estimate the expected returns for an investment or portfolio. This requirement is also applicable for performance measurement and bond pricing, but according to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005) and Ray (2012) the assumption of the existence of a truly risk-free asset is flawed and deceitful. Also, as there is no consensus of what can be considered as an ideal risk-free rate proxy, the incorrect specification of a risk-free rate can lead to insufficient allocation of scarce resources (Bruner, Eades, Harris & Higgins, 1998) . This led to the goal of this paper, which entailed evaluating how risk-free are some of the South African risk-free rate proxies, and thus determine the ideal risk-free rate proxy to use over a pre-, during and post-financial crisis period.
The results from this paper accentuated the problem of choosing a risk-free rate proxy, as all proxies under evaluation exhibited a certain level of risk, volatile returns, and to some small extent, move in tandem with the market. By consulting the level of volatility, by means of a EWMA model; annualised covariance; and alternative risk measures this paper was able to construct and overall ranking to determine the most ideal risk-free rate proxy. These alternative risk measures entailed upside and downside risk, the maximum drawdown, the deviation in the maximum drawdown, and the deviation in the maximum upturn. From the overall results it was evident that the most ideal risk-free rate proxies was the 3-month T-Bill rate and the 3-month NCD rate over the pre-, during and post-financial crisis periods, respectively. This paper also consulted the level of price risk, after which it was established that the R157 was the most ideal capital market proxy to consider, which justified the creditability of previous studies that recommend this proxy. Finally, this paper also demonstrated the applicability of adapting a dynamic approach by consulting a rolling Omega ratio to illustrate how risk evolved over time.
Overall, this paper only provides the first step of establishing a selection process to determine the most ideal riskfree rate proxy. From the results reported in this paper several interesting findings were made which can serve as a motivation for future studies that can refine this process. For example, there was some evidence which endorsed the applicability of the business cycle as an indicator for determining the more ideal risk-free rate proxy. As these findings contradict one of the characteristics of a risk-free rate asset, which states that risk-free assets should not be influenced by economic events (see Harrington, 1987) , it will be interesting to evaluate the influence of other financial and economic events on the selection of risk-free rate proxies. It will also be interesting to see how the incorporation of interest rate expectations, the prime rate and the business cycle as leading indicators will assist the selection process and thus improving future investment or portfolio decisions. Another interesting study will be to determine if there is a significant relationship between market efficiency and the choice of risk-free rate proxies, as greater market efficiency will lead to less noise (risk), which can influence the excess returns of an investment or portfolio. Finally, a further investigation is recommended to extent the applicability of more dynamic-based approaches, such as the rolling Omega ratio, in order to overcome the static approach that can limit future investment decisions.
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